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Chapter 1: Introduction 
As the largest and most powerful alliance in the history of the world, the future NATO is 
a topic of incredible importance for the future of international relations. At the end of the Cold 
War, the bipolar structure which led to the creation of NATO was suddenly gone. The Soviet 
Union had been reduced to a shadow of its former glory, and the threat it represented to the 
nations of Western Europe was gone. Without a nemesis to unite it, many predicted NATO 
would disintegrate following the trend of every other alliance in history. Nevertheless, the 
Alliance has remained, and even in the absence of the unified Soviet threat, has grown to 
encompass the majority of Europe and be more active than at any point in its history.  
The future of NATO is a topic of great importance to the future of the world for two 
reasons: first, as a union of many of the great powers, both current and former, of the world, it 
holds a stabilizing role in preventing a return to the system of multipolarity which defined the 
history of Europe; and secondly, it is the primary example of a union of democratic powers and a 
working example of Kantian and Deutschian theories on democratic peace. The collapse of 
NATO, due to a lack of a serious threat, could even return Europe to an anarchic system of 
multi-polarity and power politics and dramatically increase the chances of war throughout the 
world. The future of world peace and the global balance of power depends upon either the 
continued dominance of NATO or the resulting power struggle if it falls apart. 
My argument about NATO’s future is a combination of both neo-realist and 
constructivist thought, an adaptation of both neo-realist power struggles and constructivist 
institutional structures. Due to a lack of a significant threat, NATO will collapse as a military 
alliance. However, due to the longevity of the Trans-Atlantic Relationship, the similarities in the 
governmental structure of its members and the history of peaceful interactions between the allies 
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on both sides of the Atlantic, the current “security community” will remain despite the collapse 
of the military aspects of the Alliance. NATO has been held together through organizational 
inertia and shifting the unifying threat to a variety of lesser threats. Nevertheless, the weakness 
of the new threat will be insufficient in maintaining the Alliance. 
In order to support this argument this paper will be divided into four additional chapters 
and a conclusion. The next chapter will provide a theoretical overview of alliance formation and 
maintenance theory. This summary will expound the theory supporting my argument and provide 
a better understanding of the prominent schools of thought upon which my paper is based.  
The third chapter will outline the origins of NATO and its development throughout the 
Cold War. In order to understand the direction the Alliance will take, it is important to know 
where it came from. This section will show how NATO was created through a perception of 
threat by the Soviet Union, and how the changing perceptions of that threat throughout the Cold 
War affected the unity of the Alliance. I also will provide a theoretical analysis of the major 
developments in the history of NATO. 
Chapter four will focus on NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union. First, I will 
outline the predictions for how the Alliance would develop based upon the theories explained in 
Chapter two. Secondly, I will outline what actually happened to the Alliance after the end of the 
Cold War. Finally, I will explain why NATO developed as it did.  
The fifth chapter will focus on the present day realities of NATO; showing how the 
Alliance developed in response to the new threats faced in the 21st Century, specifically the 
issues of Russia, the “War on Terror,” and the threat faced by collapsed states; moreover, this 
section will elaborate on the strains the Alliance faces due to its extended operations. I also will 
show how NATO is setting itself up for the future by examining the developments of NATO’s 
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new direction as outlined in the meeting of Ministers in Prague in 2003 and the Strategic 
Concept of 2010. 
I will conclude the paper by outlining the predicted future of NATO based upon the 
trends and theories developed throughout the course of the paper. In this section I will show that 























Chapter 2: Alliance Theory 
 As a discipline within the field of international relations, alliance theory has historically 
been underrepresented. This is due to a variety of reasons, not least of all its apparent simplicity. 
In his Nations in Alliance, George Liska calls it “impossible to speak of international relations 
without referring to alliances,” and places the blame of the lack of resources on the fact that it is 
“difficult to say much that is peculiar to alliances on the plane of general analysis.”1 In other 
words, there is not a lot to say which has not already been said. It has been common sense since 
the days of Thucydides that alliances are bodies of states working together for a common goal, 
most likely against a common enemy. To delve further into the formation or maintenance of 
alliances is, for many students of international politics, rather unnecessary. This general lack of 
enthusiasm resulted in a general drought of scholarship on this issue. The literature which did 
emerge, however, can be separated into three distinct theories in the area of alliance formation: 
realist/neorealist theory, liberalist theory, and constructivist theory. In the area of alliance 
maintenance, there are two prominent theories: neo-realism and institutionalism/organizational 
behavior. The sections which follow will serve to outline the basics of each theory and its 
corresponding literature. Through this discussion of literature, I will develop the theoretical basis 
from which I will analyze the actions and reactions of NATO and form a prediction on its future.  
Alliance Formation 
Realism/Neorealism 
 Originating in the international relations theories of Thucydides, Machiavelli and 
Hobbes, the “realists,” and their intellectual heirs the “neorealists,” base their arguments in a 
                                                 
1
 George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 3. 
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belief in the anarchic nature of the international stage. Beginning with Hans J. Morgenthau’s 
Politics Among Nations, and continuing through Liska, Kenneth Waltz, and Stephen Walt (with 
modifications by the latter two), “realist” literature reestablished the historically prominent 
balance of power perspective of alliance creation. The essential argument is summarized best by 
Liska as he writes: “Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.”2 In 
other words, the sole purpose for alliances is to respond to a threat posed by an opposing power. 
According to Morgenthau, nations have three possible responses to a threat posed by an 
opposing power: “They can increase their own power, they can add to their power the power of 
other nations, or they can withhold power of other nations from the adversary.”3 The latter two 
choices result in alliances; a policy which is not preferred by a nation, for it reduces the nation’s 
ability to pursue its own interests, but which will be enacted if absolutely necessary.4 
 On the formation of alliances, Stephen Walt’s The Origins of Alliances is one of the most 
respected and quoted sources. Using historical evidence, Walt argues that the creation of 
alliances is based primarily on balancing and bandwagoning actions taken by states in response 
to a rising threat one or more states. Bandwagoning behavior is displayed when a state aligns 
itself with a nation which is growing in perceived power and is a possible threat to the original 
state. In essence, success in policy, war, or simply the creation of a large enough threat will drive 
the nations on the “sidelines” to ally with the nation displaying success. 5 In terms of balancing, 
Walt adjusts the theory presented by Morgenthau and Liska, arguing that instead of simply 
moving to create equilibrium in the face of power, the formation of alliances is in response to a 
                                                 
2
 Liska, 12. 
3
 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson (ed), Politics Among Nations, 5th Edition, (New York: McGraw 




 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1987), 19. Bandwagoning is also discussed in 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), 126. 
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perceived threat. “Threat” is based upon the “power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and… 
intentions” of the opponent.6 As opposed to balance of power theory which suggests that nations 
will adjust to the largest power, balance of threat allows for the creation of a coalition which is 
much more powerful than the opposing one, since the threat perceived by the allies is much 
greater with the opposition gaining power than with the allies growing too strong. This explains 
how coalitions can be formed in order to defeat opposing coalitions, such as the allies defeat of 
the Axis powers in World War II.7 
Ole Holsti, P. Thompson Hopman, and John D. Sullivan’s behavioral analysis of 
alliances in Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances attempts to find a correlation 
between the construction and behaviors of alliances and the theoretical predictions provided by 
the various schools of thought. Though they did not find any real conclusive results supporting 
any of the theories of alliance formation, they were able to show a change in behavior based 
upon threat. They found that a rise in threat level significantly increased the cohesion of an 
alliance, allowing the alliance to respond more readily to the threat.8 Though correlation is not 
causation, this does show some support for “realist” theory of balance against a threat. 
Liberalism 
 Founded by the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, the concept of liberalism is a far 
more idealistic theory than its realist counterpart. Unlike the realists’ perpetual state of anarchy 
and power politics, classical liberalists believe that there is a potential for peace other than the 
balancing of power. Likewise, there is potential for the development and maintenance of 
alliances outside of the search for strength and maneuvering for power.  
                                                 
6




 Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: 
Comparative Studies, (New York: Wiley, 1973), 84 and 143. 
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 In his essay “Perpetual Peace,” Kant dares to suggest an actual set of guidelines through 
which peace can actually be established. Primary among his arguments is a worldwide adaptation 
of a “republican constitution.”  
The reason is this: if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that 
war should be declared… nothing is more natural than that they would be very 
cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the 
calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the 
costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation 
war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a 
heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be 
liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.9 
 
Thus the citizens will be unlikely to come to a consensus in declaring war since, unlike with an 
autocratic ruler, they will be forced to bear the brunt of the war by themselves.10  
 Though a particularly attractive proposition, liberalist theory has drawn significant 
amounts of criticism from the realist theorists. The detailed studies of alliances by Stephen Walt 
critiques the concept arguing that there is little evidence that alliances are created and maintained 
due to similarities in ideology (though as it was a adapted for historical study as collaboration 
between states of comparable ideology rather than between republican governments).11 Holsti, 
Hopmann, and Sullivan, show that there is some relationship between ideology and the creation 
of alliances, but it is not applicable to all areas of alliance cooperation.12  
In a more updated overview of Kant’s theories as applied to the modern world, Michael 
W. Doyle argues that even though democratic states are not less warlike in comparison to non-
democratic nations, “constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one 
                                                 
9
 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” (1795), Accessed 2/23/11, 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm. 
10
 See Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War; A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1959), for a detailed overview of both liberalist and realist theory.  
11
 Walt p. 266  
12
 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, p.65 
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another.”13 While it is difficult to argue that the wars are impossible, it seems apparent that 
nations with similar democratic constitutions seem to find other outlets, rather than war, to 
resolve their conflicts. He goes on to provide a strong critique of realist interpretations of the 
current state of peace between the liberal states. Though, realists argue, the benefits of balance of 
power and prudent diplomacy might be reasons behind this, at no time in history have the 
“traditional” diplomatic policies brought about such a breadth and depth of peace.14 
Constructivism 
 “Constructivist” advocates of theories of alliance creation and maintenance, argue that 
they exist somewhere between the idealism of Kantian liberalist theory and the anarchic world 
outlined by the realists. Constructivism “claims that how the material world shapes, changes, and 
affects human interaction, and is affected by it, depends on prior and changing epistemic and 
normative interpretations of the material world.”15 In other words, they believe that our values 
and perception of the world is what shapes its political realities. In the pursuit analyzing alliances 
and the development of peace, the constructivists advance the theory of “security communities” 
first outlined by Karl Deutsch.   
 Though not a constructivist himself, Karl Deutsch’s theories on “security communities” 
have been fully integrated into the constructivist views on alliance theory. He summarizes this 
concept stating: “A security-community… is one in which there is real assurance that the 
members of the community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in 
                                                 
13
 Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (1983), 
Accessed 2/23/11, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265298. 213, (authors emphasis) 
14
 Ibid., 218-221.  
15
 Barnett and Adler, 15 
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some other way.”16 These communities can become integrated into two separate bodies. (i.e.) 
amalgamated security-communities, that is two independent states brought together into a single 
state; or into pluralistic security communities, two legally separate bodies which are unified in a 
common goal, yet will never fight each other. An example of the first would be the United 
States, while an example of the second would be NATO.17  
Unlike the Kantian liberalists who argue a very similar hypothesis, constructivists do not 
limit the development of these communities to democracies. Societies can become entwined  
[t]hrough transactions such as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational 
exchanges, and the use of physical communication facilities, a social fabric is 
built not only among elites but also the masses, instilling in them a sense of 
community.18 
 
Rather than being based upon a political ideology, security communities emerge from continued 
interactions, institutional similarities, and historical connections between two or more societies. 
It is important to mention that Deutsch means this movement as a permanent transition rather 
than a simple alliance, essentially stating that states can become unified in such a way that they 
are no longer concerned about balancing the other members of their community or the inherent 
security dilemmas of alliances.  
Alliance Maintenance and Behavior 
Neorealism 
The behavior of alliances, and the nations which make up alliances, is discussed with 
vivid detail in Kenneth Waltz’ theoretical work Theory of International Politics. Waltz is 
dissatisfied with a simple discussion of balance of power, since it does not predict behavior of 
                                                 
16
 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 5. 
17
 Ibid., pp. 6-7 




alliances.19 Though a state will ally with anyone in response to a great enough threat, the 
effectiveness of these alliances is based upon how well they are managed and how tightly bound 
the states are. The basic argument Waltz advances is: the greater the cohesion of a bloc, and the 
stronger the coercive power of the leader of the bloc, the more flexible its policy. This is the case 
because the allies can act more broadly when they are more certain that their alliance will not fall 
apart due to conflicts of interest. 20 Therefore, in a multi-polar world, alliances are less able to be 
flexible on policy since alignment between alliances can change rapidly; in order to keep the 
alliance, the powers must compromise their interests. In contrast, a bipolar world allows the 
alliance leaders to have greater control over the policies of their respective alliances, since the 
contributions of the minor players, though wanted, are not necessary for the leader to retain 
power.21 
 In the area of intra-alliance cooperation, Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan do provide a 
depth of analysis which is of particular use in analyzing the maintenance of alliances. They 
outline four basic theories for of the ability of an alliance to continue and to function: ideological 
homogeneity, regime stability, unity of goals, and systemic characteristics. Again, the data they 
provide little conclusive support for either theory, but they do show that each is a contributing 
factor.22 
 In his book, Alliance Politics, Glenn H. Snyder provides an in-depth overview of alliance 
theory and, through a detailed historical analysis of alliances in pre-World War I Europe, 
advances a series of theories on how alliances are managed. Though he bases his argument on 
“neorealist” theory, he updates a series of terms and arguments; redefining them based upon 
                                                 
19
 Waltz (1979), 122-123. 
20
 Ibid., pp. 166-167. 
21
 Ibid., pp. 168-169. 
22
 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 59-85. 
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more modern realities of alliance. In the area of alliance formation, Snyder cautions against strict 
reliance upon the theories of balancing arguing that it tends to be, in reality, more of an 
“automatic systemic tendency” to shift towards powers with similar interests as opposed to an 
actual conscious decision to balance (though ultimately it ends similarly).23 In terms of alliance 
management, Snyder’s theories can be summarized as an attempt to balance a state’s interests 
with the relations between other nations in the alliance. This creates occasions when a nation acts 
seemingly against its best interests in order to maintain its relationship with its allies. Such 
actions, such as consulting with allies before making large changes and obliging the desires of 
allies over one’s own interests, are attempts to maintain alliances in the absence of significant 
threats or sufficient cohesion within the alliance.24  
Institutionalism/Organizational Behavior 
 A relatively new addition to the theoretical explanations of the actions of states and 
alliances is the institutionalist camp. Institutionalism derives from liberalist and constructivist 
theories for its arguments emerge after the states have come together and formed international 
institutions. Institutions are, as defined by one of the founders of the movement Robert O. 
Keohane, a “related complex of rules and norms identifiable in space and time” which can be 
formed into regimes which are “specific institutions involving states and/or transnational actors, 
which apply to particular issues in international relations.”25 The importance of these institutions 
in terms of alliances is that “alliances are institutions, and that both their durability and strength 
(the degree to which states are committed to alliances, even when costs are entailed) may depend 
                                                 
23
 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1997), 156-158. 
24
 Ibid., pp. 350, 361, 371. 
25
 Qtd. in Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War,” International Organization 50, no. 3 
(Summer, 1996): 461. 
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on their institutional characteristics.”26 In other words, a nation within an alliance’s actions may 
be limited due to the institutional characteristics of an alliance, so the nation may act against its 
best interest due to its participation. Institutionalists do not deny the validity of realist theories on 
formation of alliances or on the realities of power unbalances, they simply qualify the theories 
with an addendum that “institutions matter” in the actions of nations.27 
 Delving deeper into the practical realities of institutional behavior necessitates the 
integration of organizational behavior theory.28 “Complex bureaucracies [such as NATO] are 
composed of individuals and interest groups who ‘must be expected to have an interest in their 
incomes and careers, and therefore in the survival of the organization in which they are 
employed.’”29 It can, therefore, be said that organizations work to perpetuate themselves, 
creating an immense resistance to change; especially the kind of change that creates the 
deconstruction of the organization. “This organizational ‘survival instinct’ may manifest itself in 
bureaucratic inertia, but it can also provide an organization with a ‘life’ of its own, and hence 
with a creative potential for inventing new tasks for the organization once old ones are 
accomplished.”30 The organization will continue to operate, and even reinvent itself, simply 
because the powers that run it do not want it to stop. 
Conclusions 
 Though these theories may come from different schools of thought, I do not find them to 
be mutually exclusive. Each theory has its benefits in analyzing a different aspect of a problem. 
                                                 
26
 Qtd. in Ibid., 462.  
27
 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 
(Summer, 1995): 44-47. 
28
 Though technically different, institutions and organizations tend to function in similar ways, and these two 
theories work well together in explaining first the creation of institutions and their actual behavior. I, therefore, will 
not distinguish between institutions and organizations in this paper.   
29
 Martin Reicherd, The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2006),  111-112 
30
 Ibid., 112. 
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Constructivism is particularly useful in analyzing the long ranging effects of alliances on the 
nations within the arrangement. Through the creation of a “security community,” nations are far 
less likely to engage in any type of martial conflict due primarily to a sense of unity more than 
any real regulations. At the same time, states will consistently be looking out for their best 
interests, and if those interests do not coincide with the maintenance of an outdated alliance, then 
it is entirely possible that the alliance will begin to disintegrate. This is especially true if the 
threat faced by the alliance is not of great urgency. A weak threat strengthens the need for 
increased involvement of institutional factors in maintaining alliance cohesion. In closing, this 
section has provided a basis for the discussion throughout the rest of the paper. The following 
chapters will elaborate on the theories presented and apply them to the specific situations 





















Chapter 3: Conceived through Threat: NATO in the Cold War 
  In order to continue advancing the argument that NATO will collapse, it is important to 
tie the actions taken in the creation and maintenance of NATO during the Cold War to the 
theories on alliance which have been discussed previously. This history reveals the Alliance’s 
beginnings; the base upon which the modern NATO is built. The Cold War also makes up 
approximately two-thirds of NATO’s active history. It is logical to assume, then, that 
conclusions made from this period will have a significant amount of weight on the subsequent 
actions of the Alliance. Keeping this assumption in mind, this chapter will outline the facts 
behind the creation of NATO. Following each section will be an analysis of the actions taken by 
NATO through the framework of the theories provided in the second chapter.  
The Origins of NATO 
 In 1945, Europe had been systematically destroyed by six years of brutal war—
physically, economically, and spiritually—which would take decades to heal. Amidst the ruins of 
Europe stood the Allied forces; victorious against the forces of Nazism, yet wary of a new 
potential conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Representative of two diametrically 
opposed ideologies, these two countries began an almost immediate struggle for the future of 
Europe.  
The Building of a Threat 
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 Even before American involvement in World War II, distrust of the Soviet Union was 
building.  In a statement to The New York Times on June 22, 1941 (immediately after the 
invasion of Russia by Germany) then Senator Truman stated: “If we see that Germany is winning 
we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let 
them kill as many as possible…”31 There was little difference, in the minds of many Americans 
and other Allied countries, between the fascist totalitarianism of Nazism and the communist 
ideologies of the Soviet Union. While gradually it became apparent that the United States would 
have to work with the Stalin and his forces, the Alliance would never be easy. Even the 
traditionally congenial and ever-diplomatic President Roosevelt, after reading a particularly 
blustering and demanding letter received from Stalin, would go on to say: “We can’t do business 
with Stalin.”32 
 As the war progressed, and victory became more certain, fear of growing Soviet 
expansionism began to increase dramatically. It was clear that Russia would come out of the war 
as the most powerful nation in Europe, and the comportment of Russia in Eastern Europe hinted 
at an alternative agenda to the destruction of Nazi Germany. Reporting on relations with Russia, 
Ambassador W. Averell Harriman wrote: “We must clearly recognize that the Soviet program is 
the establishment of totalitarianism [in Eastern Europe], ending personal liberty and democracy 
as we know and respect it.”33 Furthermore, it must be understood that the Soviets would not 
follow the general rules of international policies, so caution must be taken in working together.34  
 After the victory in Europe, the three leaders—Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and 
Harry Truman—met to discuss the future of Europe at a conference in Potsdam from July 17 to 
                                                 
31Qtd in David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 262. 
32
 Qtd in Ibid., 371. 
33





August 2. In the weeks prior to the conference, Churchill, requested multiple times that he and 
President Truman meet to discuss their approach to the Russian problem. Though aware of the 
threat, Truman refused, fearing that Stalin would see this act as an alliance against him. 
Nevertheless, Potsdam was a conference which did little to change the set views of any of the 
Allies. Stalin refused to relinquish any of his sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, while 
Truman and Churchill preached of the need for an international order to defend international law. 
Ultimately the Potsdam Conference resulted in the beginning of a reality which would dominate 
the world for the next 45 years: two separate spheres of influence, by two ideologically opposed 
powers.35 
Analysis 
 The weakness of the Allies was apparent to all, and though the Soviet Union was 
significantly damaged, it chose to act from a position of power and repeatedly demanded the 
ability to have a virtual free rein in Eastern Europe. As the expansionist goals of the Soviet 
Union became more obvious, the distrust and fear among the allies grew. Through this slow 
increase in perception of threat, the unity of opinion grew against the Soviet Union. Among the 
Americans, there was a great sense of unease with the goals of the Soviet Union, but not enough 
to follow Churchill into building a consensus against Stalin.  
Two main theories can be used to explain the actions of the countries at the end of World 
War II. From a neorealist perspective it can be seen that the threat from the Soviet Union, though 
substantial, was not sufficient to create a solid alliance against the former “friend.” Truman was 
unwilling to isolate the Soviets completely, for the threat faced was not substantial enough to 
create a direct change in policy. 
                                                 
35
 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 434-436. 
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Certain credence can be given to the liberalist theory as well. Though there was no formal 
change in alliance, the values from the two democracies—the United States and Great Britain—
begin to shine through in their cooperation during the Potsdam conference. The two leaders are 
working together based upon their shared values, despite the initial reluctance of the Truman 
administration to unite formally against the Soviets.  This action shows an informal alliance 
forming between the democratic nations against the authoritarian Russians. 
Reconstruction, a Growing Threat, and the Formation of NATO 
 After an explosive display of power by the United States in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
most violent and destructive war in the history of the world officially ended on September 2, 
1945 with the formal surrender of Japan to the United States. While this period of direct 
hostilities was over, it began a new era of diplomatic battle lasting until 1991.  
 As stated above, the growing distrust between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers 
(led primarily by the United States) had divided Europe into two separate spheres of influence: 
the Soviet Union in the East and the other Allied nations in the West, with Berlin acting as the 
meeting point between the two. With the rest of the democratic powers mostly destroyed by the 
war, the traditionally isolationist United States saw itself as the sole defender of democratic 
freedom against the specter of communist ideology. This leadership position became especially 
trying as the effects of the war were felt and Soviet influence began to expand into more 
territories as the colonial powers (particularly Great Britain) began to retreat from their areas of 
influence.  
  This issue came to a head in the beginning of 1947. Greece and Turkey were going to 
lose their funding from the United Kingdom and were on the verge of economic collapse. 
Making matters worse was the interest that the Soviet Union was placing in the area. The signs 
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were pointing to an imminent Communist party takeover of the nations. With an incursion into 
Greece and Turkey, the Soviet Union had a staging block with which they could spread into 
Africa, Iran, and even Western Europe. The United States alone was in a position to act against 
this expansion.36 
 The American response was quick and direct: $400,000 would be sent to aid Greece and 
$350,000 to Turkey. In his speech to the Congress in proposing this act, President Truman 
outlined the new mission of the United States in protecting the world order:  
To support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressure… [and] to assist free people to work out their 
own destinies… primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential 
to economic stability and orderly political process.37 
 
The United States would move to support democracy, with the goal of containing the threat of 
Soviet influence throughout the world. Known as the Truman Doctrine, this piece of legislation, 
and its policy of containment, became one of the cornerstones of American policy throughout the 
Cold War. 
 The next important policy which served as a foundation to NATO was the Marshall Plan, 
an ordinance which had the desired, dual outcome of strengthening the ties between the United 
States and Europe and in furthering the division between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. 
First outlined in a speech by Secretary of State George Marshall at Harvard University, the 
Marshall plan had the goal of reviving “a working economy in the world so as to permit the 
emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”38 It was not 
ostensibly directed against any nation, in fact the Soviet Union was invited to participate though 
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it declined, but it was done with the understanding that the aid would be going primarily to 
Western Europe. This prediction was validated once the Soviet Union stated their intention to 
abstain from participation. With the cooperation of Britain, France, and other minor European 
nations, a plan was devised for the recovery of Europe. Over the next three years the United 
States would be loaning raw materials and basic production necessities to Europe in exchange for 
a return payment after recovery.39 
 Stalin responded to these measures by solidifying his area of influence. Any leaders 
thought to have even the slightest nationalist tendencies were purged, and in February 1948, a 
communist coup occurred in Czechoslovakia sending shockwaves throughout the continent. The 
fear of other communist inspired coups and continued Soviet expansion culminated in the 
Brussels Treaty signed in April, 1948, between the Benelux nations, the United Kingdom, and 
France, creating the Western Union Defense Organization, the first example of a joint defense 
pact in Western Europe. It was immediately apparent, however, that Europe did not have the 
material power to stand against the Soviet Union alone; the United States would have to get 
involved.40  
 Though the need for American military aid to Western Europe was becoming 
increasingly apparent, it took another significant break with the Soviet Union to create the North 
Atlantic Treaty: the blockade of Berlin in June, 1948. The response by the Western nations was 
calm, yet firm; an airlift, which would alleviate the suffering of the Berlin people, and not 
directly antagonize the Soviets. After much conversation and negotiation, Stalin finally gave up 
his attempt to achieve full control of Berlin and lifted the blockade on May 23, 1949, a little 
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more than a month after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Reflecting on the lesson 
learned through this process in his memoirs, Secretary of State Dean Acheson writes:  
Soviet authorities are not moved to agreement by negotiation… They cling 
stubbornly to a position hoping to force an opponent to accept it. When and if 
action by the opponent demonstrates the Soviet position to be untenable, they 
hastily abandon it…41  
 
In other words, it is necessary to meet the Soviet Union’s demands with resolute force, or they 
will continue without concession.  
The increased aggression by the Soviet Union in the blockade of Berlin in 1948 and their 
continued attempts to expand their influences into the West, led to the creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949. The original signatories included 12 nations--the United 
States, Canada, the signatories of the Brussels Treaty, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and 
Portugal. The treaty outlined a variety of goals: settling international disputes, strengthening free 
institutions, and the encouraging economic cooperation.42  The most important aspect of the 
treaty, however, was its commitment to military defense including the oft-mentioned Article 5, 
stating “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all,” thus authorizing repercussive force by any member.43 In 
supporting Article 5, and alleviating the fears of being drawn into a foreign war without consent, 
the signatories added in Article 11 stating that the “Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions 
carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”44 
Through this Article the member nations would retain their own capability to go to war, ensuring 
that it was carried out legally. Following the signing of the document was the creation of the 
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joint military organization known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO; 




 The threat of the Soviet Union was growing, and the inability of Europe to protect itself 
was more apparent than ever. As Russia moved in to take over Eastern Europe, there was little 
the allies could do. The development of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were clear 
actions of balancing by the United States against the threat of the Soviet Union. The former 
worked to solidify the support of the Greek and Turkish nations through both economic and 
political means, by making it clear that the United States would fight to maintain the freedom of 
election within a nation. The Marshall Plan took the same theory and applied it on a broader 
scale to Western Europe as a whole, giving the Western Powers a greater ability to rebuild and 
creating a stronger alliance base against the Soviet Union.  
 The Brussels Treaty of 1948 is another example of balancing against a common threat. 
With the fall of Czechoslovakia, the rest of Europe started fearing uprisings in their own nations 
as well. It was obvious to the Western European nations that they could not stand against the 
threat of the Soviet Union independently, but unified they were much more powerful. Through 
this defense pact, they could ensure that the Soviet Union would be less likely to invade due to 
the increased possible cost of retaliation.  
 In a similar fashion, the North Atlantic Treaty came together. The growing 
aggressiveness of the Soviet Union and the weakness of Western Europe made it essential for the 
United States to get involved. The major impetus for United States involvement—the reasoning 
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given to the population—was to halt the expansion of Soviet ideology, and strengthen Europe. 
This argument is also supported by the North Atlantic Treaty itself. The centrally important 
Article 5 is directly in line with the balancing of threat theory, for it requires military action to 
protect any nation within the Alliance. In another view, it is an assurance of protection against a 
perceived threat.  
 Even the selection of members for the Alliance is an example of neorealist balance of 
power politics. Liberalist theory would predict the union to consist of allies with similar 
ideologies, and this is ostensibly the goal of the Alliance as laid out in the founding document; 
however, the inclusion of Portugal, then residing under the Salazar authoritarian government, 
shows a desire to unite against the threat of communism regardless of ideology. 
Alliance Maintenance: NATO from 1949-1989 
Solidifying the Alliance 
 The threat faced, though initially expressed above, was solidified in a document created 
by the National Security Council in 1950, known as NSC-68. The Kremlin sought to expand its 
control directly over all countries which it could influence, and would continue unless opposed. 
That would be the role of the United States and its allies.45 Furthermore, the only way for the 
confrontation of ideology to end was the total conversion of the Soviet Union away from its 
communist ideology. Uniquely, the document rejected the use of destructive force, arguing that 
the national values it sought to advance “would be achieved through global reform, not global 
conquest.”46 Ironically, this ideology would lead to military action in order to achieve these 
heady, democratic goals. 
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 Despite the signing of the NAT and the American commitment to end communism, it 
became apparent that the forces for the defense of Europe were drastically insufficient for their 
task. At the end of June, 1950 the United States became involved in Korea, in response to the 
aggression of communist North Korea, sponsored by the Chinese and Soviet Union. It was 
argued that a failure to act would lead to increased brazenness by the Soviets, and possible 
expansion into Europe.47 The result of this was an increase in the belief of NATO cohesion and 
the putting of the “O” in NATO in June 1950.48  
The war in Korea had a direct impact on the organization as a whole, helping to unify the 
Alliance in a way which nothing else could have. Here was a direct threat by Communist power 
on a free nation, necessitating intervention from a member of NATO. This conflict had a few 
extremely important consequences on the future of NATO. First, it assured that the United States 
would continue to be involved in Europe, for if the Soviet Union would make a move in Korea it 
was possible that it would force the issue in Central and Eastern Europe as well.49 In response to 
“the sixty thousand East German military police and twenty seven Russian divisions also in East 
Germany… [were] NATO’s twelve ill-equipped and uncoordinated divisions with little air 
support.”50 However, due to the lack of funds and men in Europe, it was apparent that it would 
be extremely difficult to create the necessary army without German involvement, in addition to 
increased American military presence. Though this was only enacted in principle—it wasn’t until 
5 years later that the Germans would integrate forces—it was a major step forward in the 
integration of the Alliance.  
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The second major change for the alliance was that the organization went through a series 
of changes in its organizational structure. The conflict in Korea resulted in the creation of 
SHAPE, the strategic command center in Europe, new political strengths being given to the 
NATO council, and increased political structuring (such as permanent advisors to the Secretary 
General). Finally, the Korean conflict gave a new geographic shape to the alliance allowing for 
the induction of Turkey and Greece in response to the growing communist pressures in the area. 
It was assured that NATO would remain relevant and would be in place against the threat of 
communism in Europe.51 
 This increase in armaments to Europe was driven by nuclear policy as well as 
conventional arms. In 1949, the Soviet Union tested their first atomic weapon, and by 1953 they 
had developed the hydrogen bomb. The presence of an American nuclear arsenal in Europe, 
provided a very powerful deterrent to the Soviet usage of weapons against Europe; similarly the 
nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union prevented NATO from using the weapons on the Soviet 
Union. The policy which developed out of this stalemate known as Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD), was the status quo for the majority of the Cold War and a primary reason 
for the limited conflict in Europe.52 
 With the exception of the hostilities in Korea, the 1950’s were relatively peaceful for the 
Alliance. In 1952, Stalin issued a “Peace Note” calling for the separation of spheres of influence 
and a cooling of hostilities, and though this had relatively little effect on NATO actions—the 
build-up of troops continued and the Americans, for all intents and purposes, ignored it—it 
issued in a relative period of détente, due to a lack in Soviet aggression. Stalin passed away less 
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than a year after this Note, and his political followers stepped carefully in order to avoid Western 
exploitation of this death. This period of détente culminated in the Geneva Summit of 1955, 
which achieved virtually nothing more than a feeling of calm and a false belief that the Soviet 
Union would be willing to make concessions.53  
During this period of relative peace, three nations joined NATO: Greece (1952), Turkey 
(1952), and Western Germany (1955). Also, in opposition to NATO, the Warsaw Pact was 
created in 1955, composed of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania.  
Analysis 
 The solidifying of the Alliance directly corresponds with the neo-realist view point. As 
the threat of Soviet expansion continued to grow stronger, the Alliance needed to continue to 
strengthen both its military might and internal cohesiveness. The acceptance, even in principle, 
of West German rearmament shows the power of the perceived Soviet threat. Since the memory 
of German atrocities remained fresh in the minds of all of the Europeans, the perceived threat by 
the Soviet Union needed to be tremendous in order for the allies to consider this action, 
especially France. This acceptance was a direct expansion of NATO power, making it apparent 
that the growth of perceived threat was a direct impetus for the strengthening of the Alliance. 
This period is an example of increased cohesion of the alliance as well. There were increased 
political and military structures being brought in to place by a strong threat on the Eastern Front. 
It was increasingly apparent that the alliance was necessary to the maintenance of peace in 
Europe.  
Issues between Allies 
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 Following, and during, the relative peace of the early 1950’s, 3 major crises broke out: 
between members of the Alliance: with the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, the Berlin Crisis between 
NATO and the Soviet Union in 1958, and the withdrawal of France from the military functions 
of NATO in 1966. 
 The Suez Canal crisis was instigated by the sale of Soviet armaments to Egypt beginning 
in 1955. The new Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was gambling that the Soviet Union could gain a 
foothold in the Middle East without any major conflict with NATO. Unfortunately, that was not 
the case. Great Britain, already concerned by the growing nationalism in Egypt led by Colonel 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, grew increasingly annoyed by the nation’s increased power, and France 
was incensed by the military and moral support Egypt provided to Algeria and Morocco. These 
nations demanded intervention and were prepared to act. America, on the other hand was 
unconvinced. President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Dulles, believed that they 
could court the nationalist Egyptians into an opposition of communism; therefore, they opposed 
any military intervention into Egypt.54 This began the deepest conflict between the three 
powerful allies of NATO. The United States went so far as to threaten its withdrawal from 
NATO if France and Britain pressed the issue. In October, 1956 British and French troops were 
ordered into the Canal, followed by an absolute resolution by the United States demanding the 
cessation of conflict. At this point the Soviet Union entered, offering to join with the United 
States in joint military action to stop the conflict, only to be rebuked by Eisenhower. At 
approximately the same time, the Soviet Union had entered into Hungary, exploiting the division 
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of NATO, and quashing an opposition movement. The next day, England and France ended 
hostilities in the Suez Canal.55 
 Due in part to the perceived split in NATO leadership, Khrushchev decided to issue an 
ultimatum in November of 1958, calling for the removal of all Western forces from Berlin, at 
which time the Soviets would withdraw from East Berlin. The ultimate goal of this would be the 
reunification and neutrality of Germany. While all parties agreed that there needed to be a 
change on the position of Berlin, none could agree on the specifics. In 1961, after the election of 
Kennedy, the Soviets began construction of the Berlin Wall. Now backed into a corner, the 
United States sent troops to the city resulting in a dead-lock. In 1963, after five years of 
grandstanding without any real action in Europe, and being forced to back-down from his 
placement of missiles in Cuba,56 Khrushchev announced that an additional treaty dealing with 
Berlin was unnecessary—essentially accepting defeat.57 NATO had held its ground and forced 
the Soviet Union to concede. This was the final major military confrontation in Europe during 
the Cold War. 
 The next great disagreement within the Alliance was the departure of the French in 1966. 
President Charles de Gaulle had entered into power again in 1958, and angered by continued 
refusal of the allies to intervene in Africa and Indochina, the perceived monopoly by the Anglo-
American relationship over the direction of NATO, and the lack of prominence of France, he 
announced that they would remove themselves from the military aspects of the Alliance.58 This 
move was also motivated by the belief that France’s development of the nuclear bomb and its 
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own military strength would serve as a sufficient deterrent to attack. It did, however, remain a 
part of the political side of the Alliance. This move affected the Alliance both militarily and 
politically.  The disruption of the military infrastructure which the Alliance depended on for 
movement of troops damaged the allies in their ability to respond to a domestic war. Politically, 
this move shifted the balance of power within the Alliance more towards the American side, 
creating an increased dominance of American policy over Europe.59 
Analysis 
 These first major divisions between the allies continue to follow the neo-realist’s 
predicted pattern of alliances. As the perceived threat fell, with Stalin’s Peace Note in 1952 and 
the Geneva Conference in 1955, the necessity of the Alliance began to diminish slightly. 
Therefore, the allies felt able to pursue a course that might alienate the United States and 
jeopardize the Alliance. France and Great Britain saw less of animmediate threat from the Soviet 
Union than against their interests in Northern Africa. Even when the United States threatened 
reprisal, France and Great Britain continued their path. Once the Berlin Crisis struck in 1958—a 
Soviet response to perceived weakness within the Alliance—the allies began to reconsider their 
actions. Both nations realized the escalation of the conflict was damaging to the Alliance and 
decided to forgo their immediate interests in favor of additional response to the greater threat.  
 Similarly, once the problems with the Berlin Crisis were finished in 1963, the immediate 
threat of the Soviet Union again appeared to be diminishing. This allowed France to become 
more concerned with its disagreements with the other allies, leading to their departure from the 
military side of the Alliance. At the same time the rest of the members of the Alliance decided to 
remain within the military structure, owing in a large part to the very real sense of threat felt by 
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the rest of the allies. Ultimately, a reduction of threat appears to increase division within the 
Alliance, while an increase in threat increases cohesion. 
 In addition to the neo-realist theory, the constructivist “security community” theory also 
is important in this series of events. Though France was disgruntled enough to remove itself from 
the military alliance, it did not alienate itself politically. Trade, political collaboration, and 
communication continued between the allies. Furthermore, the fall out between the allies was not 
sufficient to create hostilities, or to drive France in to the Soviet camp. The years of cooperation 
had strengthened the ties of the allies, so even if issues divided them, there was little potential for 
conflict. 
The End of the Cold War 
 After the major problems of the late 1950’s and 1960’s, the remainder of the Cold War 
was fought primarily through proxies. The “wars” which took place were fought through 
secondary parties (Nicaragua), or between one power and secondary forces supported by the 
other (Vietnam and Afghanistan).  Though Vietnam proved to be an increasingly large problem 
for the Americans, it had little impact on the Alliance as a whole. The 1970’s were characterized 
by Richard Nixon’s détente and triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and the 
Soviet Union. This development, though particularly interesting in its relation to realist theory, 
had no real effect on the operations of NATO as a whole. 
In the 1980’s, the United States took on a position of increased spending, forcing the 
Soviet Union to bankrupt itself while competing for dominance in the arms race. Finally, 
beginning with Gorbachev’s famous glasnost and perestroika, the Soviet Union lost its position 
of power. It was unwilling or unable to stop neither the revolution in Czechoslovakia, nor the fall 
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of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and it was unable to hold itself together when calls for reform 
dissolved the Union in 1991.  
The issues within NATO had essentially been resolved: France decided to leave the 
military side of NATO, while Great Britain took on a more supportive role in relation to 
American dominance. The main issues came from the developments in the nuclear field. The 
ever increasing reliance on nuclear power made it less and less likely that any real conflict would 
take place on European soil. The destructive power of these weapons and the constant threat of 
Mutually Assured Destruction led to the development of the START treaties decreasing the 
production of nuclear weapons.  
 In essence, the threat of the Soviet Union remained through the end of the Cold War, but 
it was no longer directly threatening Europe. While the Berlin Wall remained a constant 
reminder of Soviet presence, there was not another Berlin Crisis which put the entire world at 
risk. While revolution was impossible in Eastern Europe, Western Europe was allowed to 
develop under the watchful eye of NATO forces. Finally, and most importantly for this 
discussion, anti-NATO forces increased, demanding the reduction of arms along the borders and 
the removal of nuclear weapons. 
General Trends in Theory 
 Through the discussion of the Cold War history of NATO, there are a few trends which 
continue to appear: increased cohesion due to threat, ideological grouping, and the development 
of increased political connection due to increased cooperation. 
Time after time an increased perception by the allies of the threat from the Soviet Union 
led to increased cohesion and cooperation. As the Soviet Union grew in its direct power in 
Europe, the Western European nations increased in their strength through growing collaboration 
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between themselves and the United States. When the threat was great enough it even led nations 
to abandon their own self-interest in pursuit of supporting the Alliance.  
The opposite is also apparent. As threat decreased, so too did the cohesion of the 
Alliance. The Suez Crisis and the departure of France from the military structure of NATO both 
occurred during periods of reduced threat on the European front.  
Even when there was no real threat to the Alliance, the nations tended to group along 
ideological lines. Before the need for NATO, Churchill and Truman took similar positions in 
their meetings with Stalin, often displaying similar values as well. Even during the Suez Crisis 
when France and Great Britain were going directly against the will of the United States, 
Eisenhower remained supportive of them when faced with joint action with the Soviet Union.  
The continued cooperation between the members of NATO even without significant 
threat is an interesting development. Though it can be seen that threat affects the interactions 
between the allies, at no point did there seem to be a legitimate concern of the Alliance falling 
apart. This seems to conform to the predictions established by Deutsch’s security community 
theory. Though there may be differences of opinion, overall collaboration—even if it is not 

















Chapter 4: A New Threat, A New Calling: NATO 1989-1999 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union threat beginning in 1989 created an existential crisis for 
NATO. The Alliance, built around the perceived threat of a foreign power, saw its unifying force 
fading away. What would be the fate of the Alliance in this new world? This section begins by 
outlining the theoretical predictions of the future of NATO after the disintegration of its enemy, 
next it delves into the actual developments of NATO during this time of reimagining, and finally 
the chapter will discuss the differences between theory and reality in order to show a deeper 
understanding of why the Alliance acted as it did. 
What Should Have Happened?: Theoretical Predictions for NATO after the Soviet Union 
Neo-realism 
 From a neo-realist perspective, the fall of the Soviet Union did not suggest a brighter 
future for the world. “[T]he keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international 
system than in the nature of the individual states.”60 Therefore, the collapse of the relatively 
stable bi-polar system which had dominated the politics of the Europe and the world as a whole 
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could only have one conceivable outcome: a return to multipolarity and the virtual state of 
anarchy which characterizes the realist image of the world. According to neo-realist theory, 
multipolarity is inherently more warlike than a bipolar world primarily for three reasons: first, 
because there are far more states in play causing greater likelihood for war than in a world where 
all nations are divided between two ideological spectrums; secondly, the relative power between 
the states is more skewed, as opposed to the essential equality of military capabilities between 
the two sides of a bipolar world; and finally, with more players in the field, it is more difficult to 
calculate the relative power of an opponent and their possible alliances.61 The logical outcome of 
this type of system, when analyzing it through the eyes of traditional realist theory, is an increase 
in conventional warfare between nations. 
 The difference between the reality of the Europe of the past, upon which most of the 
theories of alliances and conflict in different international systems are based, is the presence of 
nuclear weapons. With weapons of mass destruction, it is possible to essentially sidestep the 
threat of conflict through miscalculation of military power, for it is impossible to attain the upper 
hand in relative power without the creation of a strategic defense; a move which is easily 
observed due to the immense cost and grand scale of the project. This would allow balancing to 
occur against the now stronger opponent, and prevent war on a grander scale.62 As proven by the 
conflicts during the Cold War, however, “nuclear weapons eliminate neither the use of force nor 
the importance of balancing behavior,” since limited warfare can occur and balance of power is 
still essential in maintaining a stable international system.63 While nuclear weapons provide 
much of the simplicity and balance of a bipolar system, the presence of many actors creates far 
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more chances for limited conflict; furthermore, the increase in nuclear armaments leads to an 
increased level of chaos due to the growing number of nuclear stockpiles and potential for their 
acquisition by rogue parties. 
 In terms of NATO, the future appeared similarly bleak. The Organization’s counterpart, 
the Warsaw Pact, dissolved fairly rapidly after the Soviet Union lost interest in maintaining it, 
and theory indicated that NATO was soon to follow. Now that the Soviet Union had collapsed, 
Europe was moving towards a majority of democracies, and the purpose of NATO, to unite “for 
collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security,” had essentially been 
completed, it was only a matter of time before NATO dissolved as well.64 Also, now that most of 
the European nations had the ability to produce nuclear weapons, it seemed unnecessary to 
maintain an alliance which essentially was acting as a nuclear deterrent.  
“Alliances are organized against a perceived threat;” therefore, historically, “war-winning 
coalitions collapse on the morrow of victory, the more surely if it is a decisive one.”65 The threat 
was gone, the nemesis defeated, and the Alliance was now more costly to maintain than it was 
worth. Kenneth Waltz summed up the neo-realist prediction for the future of NATO saying:  
Europe and Russia may for a time look on NATO, and on America’s presence in 
Western Europe, as a stabilizing force in a time of rapid change… The Soviet 
Union created NATO, and the demise of the Soviet threat “freed” Europe, West 
as well as East. But freedom entails self-reliance… In the not-very-long run, 
[Europe] will have to learn to take care of themselves or suffer the consequences. 
American withdrawal from Europe will be slower than the Soviet Union’s. 
America… can still be useful to other NATO countries, and NATO is made up of 
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 Though different in their predictions on why alliances form, liberalism and 
constructivism are fairly equivalent in understanding why they remain together. Liberalist theory 
predicted a slightly better course for the future than its neo-realist counterpart. With a the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the essential invalidation of communism as a political 
ideology, the path was open to governmental reform in the former Warsaw Pact nations and in 
the other nations formerly under Soviet influence. This new development could conceivably lead 
to a much larger population of democracies and thus a broader area of peace. Liberalism would 
suggest the fostering of democracy in these newly open nations and an increased economic 
cooperation. 
 The future of NATO, according to liberalist and constructivist theory, would be slightly 
more certain. An alliance based upon common values, as liberalism predicts, is more likely to 
continue to function stably even though there is no common threat.67  Furthermore, though the 
allies had become closer and were more likely to trust each other due to their shared values and 
long term interactions, the presence of large amounts of military personnel is an unnecessary 
disturbance.  
 There would, however, be no real reason for NATO to collapse either. Due to the amount 
of time spent trading, working, and confiding together, the allies had become a “security 
community” in every sense of Deutsch’s definition; therefore, continued cooperation was 
extremely likely. Concurrently, NATO could serve as both a consultation body for the allies and 
a safety net against any back-slide in the advances of democracy in the former-Soviet Union.68 
NATO also could serve as a tool for the fostering and advancing of democracy around the world, 
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by using Article 10 of “The North Atlantic Treaty” to expand its membership to recently 
democratized nations. Essentially, liberalist and constructivist theory would predict continued 
cooperation by the allies, despite the lack of threat, a decrease in foreign armaments present in 
Europe, and an increased drive for expansion to help create a broader democratic peace. 
Institutionalism/Organizational Behavior 
 Much like the liberalist and constructivist theories from which it comes, institutionalism 
did not predict as bleak of a future as neo-realism. The structures from the international systems 
established during the Cold War would essentially remain in place with a few changes to the 
future goals of institutions such as NATO. Once they have been established, institutions work to 
keep themselves going. The institutional structures help to foster continued cooperation between 
the allies.69 As explained by Robert McCalla: 
Institutionalist theory would lead us to expect that rather than folding NATO’s 
tent, declaring victory, and moving on to create new institutions, NATO members 
will take the alliance in new directions, making use of existing procedures and 
mechanisms to build on past successes to deal with new problems.70 
 
In other words, there is no reason to reinvent the wheel. Since the members of the institution 
understand the procedures and structures of their current system, they would simply adapt it to 
the next problem. 
 This theory led, when combined with organizational behavior, to the prediction that 
NATO would continue as it did before simply with new goals and adapted missions. Since 
NATO had been an institution for 40 years, it was highly unlikely that it would dissolve rapidly. 
The organization will find ways to keep itself relevant in order to keep itself running, and in 
doing so, it would protect the careers of the bureaucrats within the organization. 
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What Really Happened: The Redefinition of a Threat and the Expansion of NATO  
With the sudden collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the subsequent fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, NATO suddenly found itself as the strongest, intact, military and political power 
in the world. Even more impressive, the Cold War had ended without any direct conflict between 
the two sides. Nuclear war had been averted, the Warsaw Pact was collapsing, and the threat of 
the Soviet Union had been all but eliminated. The Alliance now stood at the most important 
crossroads since its creation with a new key question: what to do without its central unifying 
threat? This section will outline the developments within NATO from 1989-2001 as the 
organization sought to recreate itself for the new realities of a new Europe. 
1988-1991: The Creation of a New Strategic Concept 
 As early as 1988, members of the Alliance were anticipating serious changes in the 
security structure of Europe. At a Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government in 
Brussels in 1988, the leaders of the nations provided an optimistic, yet still cautious statement on 
the new direction of NATO. While they recognized the importance of Gorbachev’s 
modernization of the Soviet economy, the Alliance announced its intention to remain “steadfast 
in the pursuit of [NATO’s] security policies, maintaining the effective defences and credible 
deterrence that form the necessary basis for constructive dialogue.”71 The allies were also 
possibly anticipating a weakening of resolve within the Alliance for they once again reaffirmed 
their commitment to the values of the organization and the importance of NATO as a security 
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force in Europe.72 Changes were imminent, and the Alliance was ensuring that it would remain 
relevant in a new Europe.  
 This desire to remain relevant gathered force as the changes in Europe reached a 
crescendo. Beginning on November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall—the great symbol of the Cold 
War—was torn down, after East Germans were allowed to cross. All throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union’s influence was disintegrating, with revolutions taking place in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. In order to discuss these changes and 
make a statement, NATO members met in July, 1990. “The London Declaration,” as the 
resulting statement was called, announced the Alliance’s pleasure with the changes in Europe, 
their interest in engaging in conversation with the former Soviet Union, and its decision to 
implement a new strategic concept in 1991.73  
Most of the nations within NATO agreed, the Alliance should remain, whether it was as a 
consultative body, a safeguard against new risks, or a check against a back-slide in the 
liberalization of the Soviet Union.74 (Or as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher put 
it:  “You don’t cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries 
on your street in the last 12 months.)”75 Therefore, in 1991, the Alliance established a new 
strategic concept, outlining the new security situation in the world--primarily the fall of the 
Soviet Union and its remaining danger to the international community—and the need for 
continued dialogue, cooperation, defense, and the preservation of peace. It also reestablished the 
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principles of Article 5, NATO’s identity as a defensive body, and emphasized the necessity of 
arms control.76  
The new Strategic Concept also organized NATO for the new set of “diverse and multi-
directional risks” which were now faced by Europe.77 It called for the creation of a different 
structure of military forces, moving towards “a limited but ‘militarily significant’ proportion of 
ground, air, and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements.78 NATO also put itself at the 
disposal of the UN for peacekeeping missions, giving it a new purpose as a peacekeeping force.79 
The immediate development from this concept was the dramatic reduction of forces in 
Europe. European nations cut their military personnel by almost 15% on average, and the United 
States reduced its troop commitment in the area by approximately two-thirds to 110,000.80 The 
large cuts in the military created the need for a restructuring of the command structures of 
NATO. The Alliance restructured itself into three separate force types: rapid response, in which 
the Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)) acted first, the Allied Command Europe Rapid 
Reaction Forces (ARRC) reinforced the (IRF(L)); the main defense forces, which were 
multinational in their command structure; and the augmentation forces, which would only be 
used to reinforce the other levels.81 The importance of this restructuring is two-fold: first, it 
served as the origins of a military force which could deal with threats rapidly and effectively; and 
secondly, it was the beginning of multinational corps—“such as the Danish-German Corps, the 
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German-Netherlands Corps, and two German-US corps”— which further integrated the 
Alliance.82  
Redefining Threat: Actions in the Balkans 
 The wars in the Balkans—first in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993, then in Kosovo in 1999—
resulting from ethnic strife and the fall of the communist powers, emerged as the first major 
challenge to the Alliance, after the fall of the Soviet Union. These wars provided the Alliance 
with a new mission and a way to solidify the new defense structure which it outlined in the 
Strategic Concept of 1991.  
As the communist influence in former Yugoslavia began to deteriorate, the ethnic 
tensions which had been preeminent in the Balkan area before the Cold War began to flare up 
once again. Beginning with Croatia’s declaration of independence in 1991, these tensions 
escalated into actual violence. By 1992, 10,000 people had been killed in the fighting and the 
conflict had spread to Bosnia, with the Bosnian Croats and Muslims taking up arms against the 
Bosnian Serbs.83 
NATO was initially hesitant to engage in the conflicts, for while it should have been 
preparing for engagement based upon the threat to European security, the internal changes 
enacted by the new Strategic Concept had not been fully integrated. The Alliance instead chose 
to call for ceasefires and conferences without any significant involvement. In 1993, the allies 
agreed to support a UN sponsored ceasefire. Due mostly to the inability of the UN forces to deal 
with the actual causes of the conflict and the increasing victories of the Bosnian Serbs, NATO 
slowly became more involved.84  Therefore, in the summer of 1995 NATO answered UN calls 




 Ibid., 65. 
84
 Sloan (2005), 95-97 
Pedersen 41 
 
for a sustained airstrike against the Bosnian Serbs, helping to create a ceasefire and aiding in 
bringing both sides to the bargaining table in December 1995.85 Following the peace talks, the 
UN issued a mandate for NATO to enforce the peace accords, and 60,000 NATO soldiers 
entered Bosnia as the Implementation Force (IFOR) with a one year timeline to enforce peace. 
These forces were soon replaced by a Stabilization Force which remained in Bosnia until 2004. 86 
 The next major involvement for NATO was in Kosovo. Beginning in 1989, with 
President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia decision to remove autonomy from the area, the situation 
in Kosovo proved to be an exceptionally destructive conflict and one which would grow to 
necessitate outside involvement. In 1998, Serbian police and military entered into conflict with 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo causing 1,500 deaths and 400,000 refugees. The escalating conflict 
drew NATO’s attention, and responding to a UN resolution, NATO began a targeted air 
campaign, in addition to diplomatic pressure, with the objective of forcing the withdrawal of 
Serbian forces from Kosovo. Though Milosevic initially agreed to ceasefire terms, renewed 
Serbian aggression in 1999, in response to an unacceptable peace treaty, resulted in NATO’s 
reinstatement of a seventy-eight day, air campaign, without a UN mandate. After the sustained 
attack, Milosevic agreed to peace term on June 3, and NATO peacekeepers (KFOR) entered the 
nation.87  
In addition to the military cost, the Kosovo campaign proved to be a politically trying 
event for the Alliance showing some serious differences in the allies’ commitment and 
perception of NATO’s roles.  Many critics argued that the lack of NATO ground forces to 
support the air strikes provided Milosevic with the opportunity to carry out severe ethnic 
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cleansing during the end of the conflict, and the critics blamed this lack of force on United States 
resistance to involvement in non-essential areas for the United States. Further criticisms outlined 
the lack of clear objectives.88 A 2001 report by the United States General Accounting Office on 
the issue, argued that the need to maintain cohesion within the Alliance led to several “doctrinal 
departures,” such as limiting the scope and duration of the conflict with “vague objectives” and 
working alliance casualties to a minimum at the exclusion of ground forces.89 All of these issues 
may have lengthened the operation and resulted in unnecessary damages to the area. 
Furthermore, the Generals which controlled the attack argued that political pressures by both the 
United States and France made it impossible to act efficiently.90 
 Both the political complications and the overwhelming presence of American weaponry 
and personnel, led to two distinct realizations. First, it became apparent that Europe needed a 
way to deal with its own problems without the involvement of the United States—a decision 
which sparked the acceleration of the European Security and Defense Policy. While NATO 
forces would be able to help with European issues, the political difficulties of using American 
power were becoming apparent. The second realization was that dealing with a direct conflict is 
difficult when constrained by political necessities. While the Alliance chose cohesion over 
effective military policy, it was becoming more apparent that this was not necessarily the most 
effective military move.91  
Enlargement  
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 As soon as the Cold War appeared to be over and the Warsaw pact was deteriorating, 
NATO began offering the olive branch to its former rivals. The rivalry was over and the new era 
required greater cooperation and friendship. This initial rhetoric was supported through a 
declaration by the NATO leaders in Brussels, in 1994. “They reaffirmed that the Alliance was 
open to membership for other European states in a position to further the principles of the North 
Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.”92 In other words, the 
way was now open for the former Warsaw Pact nations to enter into NATO, for the improved 
security of both the new and former allies. The task now lay in creating the legal framework for 
such a move, and convincing the domestic governments that it was a strategic move.  
 The Alliance launched a study in 1995 to determine whether the Alliance should accept 
any new allies, especially since these new countries would be from the former Soviet Bloc. It 
was concluded that the enlargement would indeed provide a benefit to the Alliance through the 
increase in security and the fostering of cooperation and “promoting good-neighborly 
relations.”93 As long as the new allies would conform to the “principles, policies and procedures” 
of NATO, be willing to accept the costs of membership, and maintain that no outside power (e.g. 
Russia) “would have the right to interfere with the process” of accession or of the actions of the 
nations within the alliance, the new nations would be allowed to join.94 
 Convincing the domestic governments of the NATO members to allow expansion was 
slightly more difficult, particularly within the United States. Accession protocols had been 
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signed in 1997, but all 16 nations had to approve.95 While most nations in Europe could 
understand the security benefits of expansion into Eastern Europe (e.g. a barrier against Russia), 
many in the United States saw NATO as a burden which was no longer needed. The argument in 
the Senate—which was required to approve the measure through a two-thirds vote—ranged 
between those who felt that NATO should be abolished, those who thought NATO should be 
restricted to Article 5 enforcement only, and those who saw a benefit in integrating new 
Democracies. After an extended battle, the Senate approved the enlargement process on April 
30,, 1998, but with the understanding that further enlargement would have to wait until the new 
allies had shown their worth. With this victory, NATO embraced the accession of three new 
members: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, in 1999.  
The Long-Term Study and the Strategic Concept of 1999 
 The issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the escalation of NATO involvement in Kosovo 
gradually began to show that the basic structures set up by the Strategic Concept of 1991 were 
not sufficient to deal with the growing out-of-area pressures on NATO. A Long Term Study96 
(LTS) into the implications of the Strategic Concept of 1991 began in 1994, providing three 
major recommendations which would culminate in a new Strategic Concept altering the 
Alliance’s military doctrine. First, the LTS outlined the necessary elements to accomplish new 
peacekeeping, crisis management, and collective defense.97 Secondly, the LTS resulted in the 
creation of a new command structure for NATO. “The new NATO command structure cut 
headquarters elements from 65 to about 20, and was based on a series of Joint Sub-Regional 
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Commands (JSRCs) and Component Commands (CCs) spread throughout the Alliance.”98 
Finally, the LTS suggested the development of the NATO Rapid Deployment Corps (NRDCs). 
There should be three High Readiness Forces (HRFs), which could enter an area immediately, 
supported by two Forces at Lower Readiness (FLRs) each, which could rotate through in order to 
relieve the other Corps. For instance, an HRF would be deployed for 180 days, followed by 
FLR1 for 180 days, followed by FLR2 for 180 days, and repeat.99 These three suggestions would 
set the stage for the creation of a NATO for a new era. 
In 1999, NATO officials met once again to develop a new strategic concept in light of the 
more recent developments. This Strategic Concept did not announce many of the real changes in 
NATO command structure which were being enacted due to the suggestions of the LTS, but it 
did provide the groundwork for many of the future developments of NATO (primarily the 
Strategic Concepts of 2002 and 2010). It allowed for the creation of more flexible, rapid 
response forces, and stated that involvement in threats against allied interests may be 
necessary.100 Importantly, it left the direct distinctions between Article 5 and non-Article 5 
threats somewhat unclear, allowing for a greater amount of out-of-area commitment.101 Though 
much of the important change in NATO was occurring behind the scenes, the Strategic Concept 
of 1999 allowed the world to see some of the new direction NATO was taking, and provide the 
basis for future developments. 
Why Reality was Different from Theory: Theoretical Analysis of NATO 1989-1999. 
 As outlined above, neo-realist theory predicted the dissolution of NATO shortly after the 
fall of the Soviet Union; however, during the decade immediately following this fall, NATO did 
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not only remain, it grew larger through the acquisition of three of its former enemies. 
Institutionalism on the other hand, predicted the expansion of NATO’s roles and its reinvention 
in order to maintain its organizational structure. On the surface then, it appears as if neo-realist 
theory was, at least for this alliance, wrong, while institutionalism was correct. 
 In one sense this assertion is correct. As NATO found itself without an enemy it began to 
look for another mission; another threat to keep it together—keeping with organizational 
behavioral theory. However, it is important to note that for all the changes which institutionalism 
claims to bring to alliance behavior, according to John Mearsheimer it is basically a 
reinterpretation of realism.102 Even the great defender of institutionalism Robert Keohane argues 
that institutionalist theory helps to “explain variation in institutional form without denying the 
validity of many realist insights into power and interests.”103 The new changes which the 
organization goes through in order to keep itself relevant are new threat analyses and essentially 
concerns about balancing the threat. It is true that the end of an alliance should come through the 
end of a conflict, but if a significant threat remains, it could conceivably remain.  
Through the early 1990’s, the possible threat from the imploding Russia remained 
legitimate. The Russian military remained strong, the nuclear weapons developed by the Soviet 
Union remained a threat, and despite the optimism, there remained a possibility of remission. 
Also, the dissolving Soviet Union left behind nations whose ethnic tensions, formerly held in 
check due to Soviet influence, returned with fervor. The Strategic Concept of 1991 essentially 
declared one theme: “even with all the positive changes, the world remained a dangerous place 
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and that NATO cooperation would be essential to help them [Europe] deal with the remaining 
risks and uncertainties.”104  
The wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were a key test for NATO; one which 
would be able to determine its relevance in the new world order. The perception of threat had 
changed, for though it could evolve into a direct danger for the Alliance, this was a situation on 
the periphery which did not directly threaten the members of the Alliance. In Bosnia, the 
mandate from the UN was helpful in creating an impetus for the intervention, which would serve 
as a stepping stone for more involvement in conflicts which did not invoke Article 5. Kosovo 
provided a more interesting precedent: involvement in a non-Article 5 security threat without UN 
mandate. This move caused debate within the Alliance, but it served to continue the process of 
reimagining the unifying threat away from the strength of the Soviet Union, to a series of smaller 
threats.105 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later Kosovo, served as well to create a new mission for 
NATO: peacekeeping. Probably the most relevant example of institutionalist theory, 
peacekeeping shows the creation of a new purpose for the Alliance in order to keep itself 
relevant. Peacekeeping allowed NATO to face growing threats which could possibly effect the 
Alliance in the future, by acting on behalf of the United Nations. This process contributed to the 
development of the new threat perception of NATO and to the legitimacy of NATO on the world 
stage. 
The enlargement process in to the former Warsaw Pact countries, though at first glance a 
refutation of realist prediction and the following of a purely liberalist agenda, is actually a 
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brilliant example of balance of power politics. The security vacuum of the Central European 
nations had directly contributed to the rise of two of the more aggressive powers in the history of 
Europe: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.106 By allowing the accession of Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary into NATO, the Alliance solidified the security situation within the area 
and moved to prevent the reemergence of any expansionist power. Furthermore, the new 
members remained directly concerned with the Russian threat, contributing to their alliance with 
a stronger protector to balance against the perceived threat. 
Two other factors support neo-realist theory: the reduction and restructuring of the 
military presence and the cohesion problems faced during the engagement with Kosovo. The 
removal of military personnel from Europe directly corresponds with the balancing of threat 
hypothesis. Since the threat faced by the Alliance was no longer as great, the troop level needed 
to defend against conceivable threats was dramatically reduced. Furthermore, now that the 
threats faced by the Alliance were much more varied and decentralized, the military structure 
needed to face them had to change. This restructuring towards the NRDCs and smaller command 
centers shows a realization of the new threat faced by NATO. 
The final and most important example of the validity of neo-realist alliance theory is the 
growing frustration within the Alliance exhibited during the air raids on Kosovo. The lack of a 
significant threat significantly decreases the cohesion of the Alliance. While the Alliance did 
choose to remain together and present a united front, the tensions within the Alliance were 
beginning to show—particularly between the Americans and the rest of Europe. America 
provided, and had been providing for the majority of the history of NATO, the majority of the 
forces, monetary funds, and military direction for the Alliance. Hence, America had generally 
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controlled the policies of the Alliance. This particular situation, however, was seen as “the hour 
of Europe;” the problem which could be solved by Europeans without American interference.107 
The frustration, on both sides, of having to conform to the desires of the other members of the 
Alliance and not pursue the “correct” doctrinal path is evident in both the responses of the 
Generals and the GAO report on the issue.  
The general conclusions which can be made about the first decade after the end of the 
Cold War are essentially neo-realist in nature with an institutionalist slant. While there is a 
distinct truth in institutionalist theory, primarily in the initial desires for the organization to 
remain together and the restructuring of roles, the majority of the results show a continued 
adherence to balance of threat policy. The Alliance adapted to the changing threats it faced, not 
through a bureaucratic effort to maintain itself, but rather because these were the greatest threats 
facing the Alliance at the time. These new threats were much less predictable and far less 
powerful than the Soviet threat; therefore, the Alliance was forced to change its approach, 
causing a drastic reduction in forces. Though much more varied and chaotic, the opposing threats 
did not measure up to the massive threat of the Soviet Union, and the appearance of tensions 
between the members of the Alliance follows the prediction of neo-realist balance of threat 
theory.  
 
Chapter 5: Beginning of the End: 2001-Present 
 
 The turn of the century brought with it a series of new challenges for the members of 
NATO. Faced with the specter of global terror after the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
United States invoked Article 5 for the first time in the history of the Alliance. This decision, in 
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conjunction with a UN mandate, took the Alliance into its first conflict outside of European soil, 
as they moved in to secure Afghanistan in 2002.  
The year 2002 brought with it other major changes for the Alliance. Meeting in Prague, 
the Alliance put forth its newest Strategic Concept, the result of a decade of steady doctrinal 
changes to the military structure. NATO now had the jurisdiction to act “out of area” and the 
structure to deal with the chaotic nature of the new threats in the 21st century.  
2003 saw the United States engage in its war against Saddam Hussein, without a mandate 
from the United Nations and supported only by the “coalition of the willing.” The United States’ 
unilateralism in the managing of both this new conflict and the war in Afghanistan produced an 
ever-growing annoyance within NATO, particularly in the older members of the Alliance.  
In 2004, the Alliance accepted 10 new members, and by 2009 they had accepted 3 more 
raising the total amount of members to 26. This expansion brought with it new problems: 
conflicts with Russia, the broadening of the Alliance’s objectives, and a myriad of issues with 
the planning side of NATO missions. 
In 2010, NATO officials met once again to announce yet another Strategic Concept in 
order to map out the future of the Alliance for the next 10 years. The new concept restated the 
allies’ unity, their commitment to the Alliance and their understanding of the new threats facing 
the Alliance in the conceivable future. Finally, the Alliance recommitted to the protection of their 
common values and the principles of common defense.  
This chapter will delve into all of these new issues facing the Alliance in the first decade 
of the 21st century. It will show the new developments of NATO, the new threats the Alliance is 
preparing for, and the tensions which are beginning to build throughout the Alliance. These 
cracks in the Alliance will be examined and explained, with the ultimate conclusion that they are 
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being created by the lack of a substantial threat, in continuation of the central argument of this 
paper. 
Creating a Direction for the Future: NATO’s 2002 Strategic Concept 
 
 Whatever plans NATO had for its future, they were accelerated after the terrorist attacks 
on the United States on September 11, 2001. For only the second time in recent American 
history, American blood had been spilled on American soil by a foreign invader. The fear and 
uncertainty which emerged from this attack prompted the first invocation of Article 5 in the 
history of the Alliance, and resulted in the joint attack and occupation of Afghanistan.108  Partly 
in response to the new military endeavors and partly as a result of events set in motion during the 
last meeting in 1999, NATO officials met once again to discuss the newest strategic concept for 
the Alliance and to formalize the further expansion of NATO.  
Meeting in Prague, in November 21-22, 2002, the Alliance once again committed to 
dealing with these new challenges by altering the framework of the Alliance. This time it was 
completely accepted that there would need to be a development of rapid deployment forces—
referred to as the NATO Response Force (NRF)—consisting of 21,000 air, ground, and naval 
troops; the final implementation of the LTS which developed in the early 1990’s.109 They also 
agreed on a “reform of NATO’s command structure to move away from its old geographic focus 
into a new functional approach organized around a command for ‘operations’ and another for 
‘transformation.’”110 This would allow NATO to act outside of its former area of jurisdiction, 
thus allowing for involvement in Afghanistan. Finally, NATO formally accepted the accession of 
seven new members: Bulgaria Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, with 
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the express purpose of strengthening NATO’s “ability to face the challenges of today and 
tomorrow.”111 This movement would raise some inflammatory responses in Russia, but 
ultimately the Alliance was more concerned about avoiding the potential of a resurgence of the 
Soviet Union than the strengthening of Russia into a realistic rival.112  
Ultimately the Prague summit has been seen as the culmination of the necessary changes 
in the post-Cold War security structure, and the implementation of the major changes which had 
been suggested as early as 1990.113  Ironically, the Alliance made these massive changes and 
commitments to a strengthening of the Alliance right at the point when the Alliance was facing 
the beginning of its biggest struggle for cohesion: the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  
The Threats of the 21st Century: How Has NATO Responded? 
 With the advent of the 21st century and the efforts NATO has taken to reinvent itself for 
the future, it is especially important to identify the new possible threats which NATO is facing 
and the ways it has responded to these threats. As NATO has sought to prove that it remains a 
necessary organization despite the fulfillment of its original mission, its response to the threats it 
faces will show us the effectiveness of its reorganization and the likelihood of the Alliance’s 
continued survival throughout the 21st century. 
 
 
The War on Terror 
 If there is any single issue which has provided new life to NATO, it is terrorism. Even 
before the attacks of September 11, NATO had seen the potential dangers of terrorism to 
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members of the Alliance. In the 1999 Strategic Concept, terrorism was called “a serious threat to 
peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States.”114 After the 
events of September 11, however, the threat of terrorism took on new meaning. The strongest 
and seemingly most protected member of NATO had been attacked on its own soil, and Article 5 
was invoked for the first time in history. Immediately the United States asked for NATO support 
in its mission to eliminate the terrorist threat from Afghanistan (the nation from which the 
perpetrators received protection and training). NATO responded quickly and efficiently by 
providing the United States with air protection, freeing up American forces to attack 
Afghanistan. It became apparent that the Alliance was again necessary. The United States’ 
Ambassador to NATO would state at a NATO summit: “With the battle against terrorism now 
engaged, it is difficult to imagine a future without the Alliance at the core of the efforts to defend 
our civilization.”115 It had become apparent that the threat of terrorism would be the main threat 
of the 21st Century.   
 Despite all of the rhetoric from the United States, it soon became evident that the Bush 
Administration was reluctant to accept contributions from European allies. While NATO troops 
did get involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, and eventually played a large part in the 
peacekeeping efforts, the desire to carry out this campaign according to American military 
doctrine without NATO interference was strong, for two key reasons. Primarily, the Kosovo 
campaign remained fresh in the minds of the American generals, and since this was a war with 
direct American interests, the generals did not want to get involved once more in the bureaucratic 
battles which lengthened the Kosovo engagement.116 The second important reason behind this 
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desire to “go it alone” was the core American distrust of ceding rights to international 
organizations. While the American government was willing to cooperate in dealing with issues 
on the periphery of its own interests, “the attacks on New York and Washington strengthened the 
United States’ belief in the legitimacy of its values and interests.”117 Therefore, it was important 
to defend American values with American weapons.  
 Interestingly, the United States complained about the lack of usefulness of NATO forces 
even while denying them the ability to play a bigger part. Even longtime NATO supporter, 
Senator Richard Lugar went on record saying: “If NATO is not up to the challenge of becoming 
effective in the new war against terrorism, then our political leaders may be inclined to search for 
something else that will answer this need.”118 The Europeans were perplexed by this reluctance 
given their enthusiasm for involvement, leaving some to comment that the United States was 
more interested in NATO support for clean-up efforts than for actually carrying out the 
mission.119  
 The “War on Terror” has brought a significant amount of issues to the Alliance, both 
militarily and politically. Since 2002, Alliance forces have been engaged in maintaining security 
and performing peacekeeping missions throughout the nation, and they—in conjunction with a 
large influx of American military forces in the recent years—have been relatively successful. 
Nevertheless, the 42 different nations became involved in the Afghanistan force (including all 28 
members of NATO), has lead to a considerable amount of bureaucratic headaches:  
Some governments’ troops lack the appropriate equipment to function with other 
NATO forces. Some nations will not permit their troops to deploy to other parts 
of Afghanistan. Still others prohibit their troops from participating in combat 
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operations unless in self-defense. NATO commanders have willingly accepted 
troops from some 42 governments but have had to shape the conduct of the 
mission to fit the capabilities of and caveats on those troops.120 
 
Other issues between the allies include disagreements on troop placement, burden sharing, 
missions of NATO forces in the area, duration of the involvement, and most importantly 
differing military policies.121 For example, on April 1, 2011, German troops were unable to take 
action to defend UN workers who were being massacred close to their position. Military doctrine 
forced them to stand by as an international force was murdered, for they are not allowed to 
engage without direct provocation.122 Despite all of these issues, NATO has been able to bring 
about a level of success in Afghanistan. Forces are set to leave in 2014, and there are initial 
transfers of power over to the Afghani government set to take place in July 2011.123 
 In relation to the war on terror as a whole, Afghanistan has shown a few key flaws in the 
use of such a threat as a unifier for NATO. Initially, there is no consistency to the threat. While 
the initial attacks of 2011, and the subsequent attacks throughout Europe, made the allies feel 
“more vulnerable than at any time since the end of the Cold War,” the reality is that there have 
been no real significant attacks in Europe or the United States for quite some time. This lack of 
threat has led to a general sense of distaste towards the war. In the United States for instance, 
approximately two-thirds of the population stated in a recent poll that the war in Afghanistan was 
not worth the cost.124 The second major problem is that it has revealed some major issues 
between the United States and Europe, particularly in the treatment of prisoners from the Afghan 
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war. Issues such as the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the United States policy of detention at 
Guantanamo Bay, have driven wedges between the allies and led this threat to be more of a 
divider than a unifier.125 
The Threat of Russia 
 Russia has been, and remains, one of the more difficult problems which NATO has to 
face. The threat caused by the Soviet Union, of which Russia was a significant part, was the 
central reason behind, and ever since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has remained a player in 
European security politics. Since it is composed of an area of 17,098,242 km2 and made up of a 
population of almost 140 million, Russia remains, on paper, a force to be reckoned with.126 
 “Russia’s relations with NATO have passed several stages after the demise of the 
USSR—from euphoria and great expectations in early 1990’s to mutual dissatisfaction and 
mistrust in the late 1990’s,” to cooperation during the early 2000’s and finally to further 
dissatisfaction and mistrust after the Georgia crisis and the missile defense propositions in 
Eastern Europe at the end of the first decade of the 21st century.127 In 1991, NATO allowed 
Russia entry into the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in order to increase cooperation 
between the two powers, followed shortly by the Partnership for Peace agreement in 1994. In 
2002, NATO developed the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which was designed to coordinate 
their responses to common threats, particularly terrorism. Russia also was involved in the Bosnia 
and Kosovo campaigns.128  
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 Despite these promising advances in NATO-Russian relations, there remains a significant 
amount of tension between the two parties, based primarily in NATO’s enlargement into the 
former Warsaw Pact nations. As stated previously, NATO expanded into the traditionally weak 
Central and Eastern European countries in order to both provide them with security and prevent 
the re-expansion of Soviet power. From the perspective of the historic members of the Alliance, 
“NATO’s expansion eastwards can be also assessed as the West’s disbelief in Russia’s 
democratic future.”129 For the Central and Eastern European countries which have joined with 
NATO, the concerns are slightly more immediate. For these nations, the Russia remains a 
looming threat consistently on their borders. While NATO may be more of a protector of 
interests in the eyes of the Western members, it remains a powerful symbol of collective defense 
and balancing of threat against the Soviet Union for the Central and Eastern European countries. 
Looking particularly at the Baltic States, many of these nations “remain indefensible against 
Russia without large NATO redeployments or nuclear deterrence.”130  
 Tensions between Russia and NATO came to a head in 2008 when Russia sent troops to 
Georgia, allegedly in direct response to Georgian violence against Russian civilians in South 
Ossetia. NATO condemned this as a disproportionately large attack and scolded Russia for its 
overbearing response, and in Washington, this merely strengthened the belief that Russia was a 
danger, with many saying that if Georgia would have been a member of NATO Russia would not 
have attacked. Western Europeans are not so sure.131 The Russian belief is that NATO had been 
pursuing a strategy of isolation towards Russia, impinging on the security and prestige of 
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Russia.132 This strategy might have provoked a display of Russian power to prevent NATO from 
continuing this expansion, especially after the offer of NATO accession to Georgia and Ukraine. 
In any case, this caused a reconsideration of expansion into the area. 
 For all of the threats felt by the Central and Eastern European countries in regards to 
Russia, “Russia’s military weight has diminished dramatically and, with all concerns about its 
unpredictability, it cannot be assessed as a direct threat to the West. This has been all the more 
the case after September 11 since Russia sided with the West against the threat of terrorism.”133 
Russia still possesses a large nuclear arsenal, but its army is largely out-dated. Furthermore, its 
economic and political situations are more akin to a normal middle-income capitalist nation than 
a world superpower.134 Finally, while Russia has been hailed as one of the more rapidly 
developing nations in the world, it is not the threat it used to be either in military might, 
economic power, or in ideological influence. 
Failed States and Civil Wars 
 The other major threat which NATO has been facing is that of failed states and the 
resulting civil wars which come out of them. While not directly threatening to the security of 
NATO members, these conflicts often affect the interests of the allies, whether it is through 
damaging economic interests, the potential for refugees, the conflicts potential of migrating onto 
European soil, or simple humanitarian concern. The most famous of these threats was in the 
Balkans, which, as discussed in chapter four, was seen as having the potential for causing unrest 
in the Western Europe and as escalating into serious human rights concerns. These conflicts tend 
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to be less of a unifying central threat to NATO, and more of a general concern which is 
addressed in conjunction with UN mandate.  
The recent situation in Libya has provided an interesting example in this style of threat. 
Riding on the surge of democratic pressure flowing throughout the Middle East and Northern 
Africa, opposition forces emerged in Libya demanding the removal of eccentric dictator 
Muammar Gaddafi. As the conflict escalated, it soon became apparent that Gaddafi’s resistance 
to this demand was leading to civil war. This proved to be a large concern for many Western 
European nations who are separated from Libya by only a small stretch of water. On March 17, 
2011, the United Nations issued a Resolution authorizing NATO to work to protect civilians by 
“all necessary measures.”135 From March 22-24 NATO began a slow escalation from enforcing 
an arms embargo to enforcing a no-fly zone and then making bombing runs in support of the 
opposition forces. NATO has formally announced that it will not send in ground troops to 
Libya.136 
This situation is particularly interesting because of the change it is displaying in NATO 
decision-making. In going into Afghanistan, the Alliance (and especially the United States) acted 
strongly, quickly and with full-force. Now in Libya, however, there has been a general reluctance 
to get involved in the issue, and when called-upon by the United Nations, NATO responded with 
a relatively small action. Even more interesting are the tensions which this mission is revealing 
within the NATO command structure. Without the United States making a significant 
commitment to the effort—President Obama having stated that the United States will be taking 
more of a “supporting role”—the European nations are being forced to take on a greater share of 
the bombing; a role they have not had to provide in the past NATO actions and one they do not 
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have the capability to maintain for a long period of time.137 Furthermore, it is becoming evident 
that the European allies are not able to perform as effectively as they would like. For example, in 
at least two separate occasions in early April, NATO forces have mistakenly fired on the Libyan 
opposition fighters who NATO is supposed to be helping, showing a disgraceful lack of 
coordination by the NATO forces.138 
This issue is causing much debate on the aspects of burden-sharing, and showing that, 
without United States leadership, NATO missions are much more difficult to maintain. 
Furthermore, this development has shown the necessity of a large threat, outside of regional 
interests, in order to get all of the players in NATO to agree on a necessary direction. 
Looking Towards 2020: The Newest Strategic Concept for the Alliance 
 The issues which the Alliance faced during the course of the first decade of the 21st 
century led it to consider, once again, the need to develop a new Strategic Concept. The new 
tensions within the Alliance threatened its very existence and, as it had done in 1991, the 
Alliance needed to reassert its commitment and reunify its members.  
In May 2010, a “group of experts” met to decide on the new direction which the Alliance 
should be taking. Their preamble provides an interesting insight into the concerns facing NATO 
and the challenges to its cohesion. First of all they outline the need for this new Strategic 
Concept in order to “highlight NATO’s many contributions to international stability and peace. 
Otherwise, the organization could fail to retain the public backing and financial support it must 
have to perform critical tasks well.”139 This statement shows a significant issue faced by the 
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Alliance: the lack of public support and funding. As the threat facing the Alliance has dropped, 
the populations of the member nations have been less supportive in funding NATO’s activities. 
Without popular support, NATO could easily lose its mandate and much of its funding. 
 The other major concern which is expressed by this group of experts relates to the 
growing lack of cohesion within the Alliance: 
The new Strategic Concept must also serve as an invocation of political will or—
to put it another way—a renewal of vows, on the part of each member. Threats to 
the interests of the Alliance come from the outside, but the organization’s vigour 
could as easily be sapped from within. The increasing complexity of the global 
political environment has the potential to gnaw away at Alliance cohesion; 
economic headaches can distract attention from security needs; old rivalries could 
resurface; and the possibility is real of a damaging imbalance between the military 
contributions of some members and that of others. NATO states cannot allow 
twenty-first century dangers to do what past perils could not: divide their leaders 
and weaken their collective resolve. Thus, the new Strategic Concept must clarify 
both what NATO should be doing for each Ally and what each Ally should be 
doing for NATO.140 
 
The struggles within the Alliance, as outlined above, are seen to be causing cracks within 
the previous resolve of the Alliance. In the previous passage, it is apparent that the organization 
itself is concerned with the potential for disbandment. While the Alliance has continued to 
expand up until this point—thus increasing its material strength—its unity, and strength of will, 
can be seen to be diminishing. This expansion has also created the problem of finding a 
consensus in the approach to security. Having twenty eight members in the decision making 
process makes it more difficult to address each of their respective concerns and thus to find a 
consensus. For instance, as shown above, the Russian question is a much more pressing issue for 
the Eastern European countries than for the West. This division in priorities has led to some 
conflicting opinions in the creation of a missile defense system and the resulting problems with 
Russia. 
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In addressing these concerns, in addition to the concerns raised by potential security 
threats, the experts recommended a series of guidelines for developing the new Strategic 
Concept. These recommendations include: commitment to providing security against 
unconventional threats; improving the partnership between NATO and a variety of other powers, 
such as Russia, the EU, the UN, the OSCE, and Middle Eastern states; unifying the financial 
policy by revising rules for contributions and giving the Secretary General the ability to enforce 
these rules; improving the issue of consensus through making it possible to give reservations to 
an idea without a veto; finally, in terms of military deployment, the Alliance should have a more 
unified command structure, and continued rapid response capabilities.141 
On November 19, 2010, the Alliance issued its most recent Strategic Concept essentially 
outlining everything suggested by the group of experts. The only major addition was the 
Alliance’s commitment to defense through crisis management, which allowed the Alliance to get 
involved in issues to prevent and manage crises which could provide a threat to NATO 
members.142 This section is particularly important for it allows direct intervention in an area with 
the goal of preventing a conflict, as opposed to simply managing one or providing peacekeeping 
support. The implications of this are very large, for no longer is NATO withholding its 
capabilities to simple prevention (i.e. Article 5), it is now able to preemptively get involved 
before the issue comes to a head. 
 
 
General Tensions within the Alliance 
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 In addition to, or perhaps because of, the lack of any real threat faced by the Alliance in 
the 21st century an additional set of tensions have begun to emerge between the members of the 
Alliance. Occurring particularly across the Atlantic, between the United States and Europe, these 
tensions are a result of cultural and political differences which are beginning to manifest 
themselves due to the lack of a significant unifier for the Alliance.  
 The first major point of dissention within the Alliance is the recent tendency towards 
American unilateralism in its policies. While the United States does work with NATO, it seems 
to many Europeans as almost an afterthought, or a mere formality to appease the Europeans. The 
first major reason behind this behavior is, while it is true that the Europeans have a greater 
supply of armed personnel in the area than the United States,  
their principal categories of advanced weaponry and equipment are far less 
numerous and only one half as much is spent to support them. Empirically, the 
United States needs NATO less as a single, unified alliance than as a reservoir of 
potential components for coalitions of the willing.143 
 
As shown by the United States comportment in the months leading up the war in Iraq, it really 
does not matter to the United States where the help comes from as long as it comes.  
 The other reason for this perception of unilateralism is that most of the conflicts which 
currently interest the United States are not on European soil. Quite frankly, “the US is an Asian 
power, but the Europeans are not.”144 The increase in American presence in the Middle East has 
led to a greater concentration of United States forces in the areas surrounding their conflicts (e.g. 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan). Unless there is a considerable shift in level of 
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conflict, “America’s capacities for military intervention and global reach will be housed 
increasingly outside the confines of Cold War-era NATO.”145  
 On the European front, there is beginning to be an ever greater lack of popular support 
for international peacekeeping and defense policy in general. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
have significantly decreased European interest in following American military operations, and 
the lack of military threat from anywhere outside the EU fails to justify any investment into 
military capabilities. A theory only strengthened during the economic crisis.146  
 In essence, NATO is rapidly becoming an “alliance à la carte,” to use the phrase coined 
by Joseph Nye.147 Both sides of the Atlantic want NATO to remain simply so that they can have 
their pick at the different benefits it provides. Part of this is a result of cultural differences, for as 
stated above, American’s are more leery of international bodies while Europeans tend to embrace 
them more fully.148 But the most important reality is that the need for NATO is slowly 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
This paper has shown a series of trends throughout the history of NATO, all of which 
lead up to an apparent reality expressed in the previous chapter: NATO is approaching its 
dénouement as a military alliance. There are three distinct conclusions which can be reached 
through the data provided: the threat faced by NATO has deteriorated to a base level of urgency, 
the organizational and institutional forces which have emerged through the history of the 
organization are working to prevent the Alliance’s unraveling, and finally the allies have 
developed into a security community. Each of these trends provides clues into the future of both 
the Alliance and its members. 
The central trend in NATO’s history is its reliance on a unifying threat as a method of 
retaining cohesion within the Alliance. During the Cold War the obvious threat was the Soviet 
Union. This opponent created the impetus for the creation of the Alliance and overcame a series 
of cohesion issues, such as the fear of German rearmament. Since the decline and fall of the 
Soviet Union, the Alliance has been searching for a new enemy to face which can provide a 
reason for its continuation (a result of the organizational friction to be discussed below). In the 
1990’s, the Balkan wars provided a likely target: they were within European territory, they had 
the potential to spill over into NATO soil, and they were rapidly becoming human rights 
disasters. The Alliance’s involvement in the Bosnia and Kosovo wars provided it with a method 
to reinvent itself and a threat through which it could remain important. Yet even these threats 
were insufficient in maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance, and tensions began to show during 
the operations in Kosovo.  
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The most recent threats faced by the Alliance have also proven unable to fill the position 
of the Soviet Union. While the “war on terror” provided a new use for the Alliance and resulted 
in the first ever invocation of Article 5, the unilateralism of the United States and the differing 
military policies have created even deeper problems within the Alliance. As of the present day, 
many European nations are decreasing their commitment. Russia has also proven to be 
unsatisfactory in its possible position as nemesis. While the fear of Russia has allowed for 
NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, the reality is that the majority of Western Europe does not 
fear Russia—and in military terms they are completely justified.  Finally, the civil wars in which 
NATO has become involved, such as Libya, have merely provided a window into the struggles 
facing the Alliance. The lack of the United States’ guidance and technology makes it impossible 
for the Alliance to act for an extended period of time. 
In essence there is no threat sufficient enough to sustain NATO. Regional interests may 
continue to provide momentary threats, but the real necessity of such a grand alliance is finished. 
When that is combined with the cost of maintenance of such a body, the likelihood of a long 
term continuation of NATO is slim. 
The second major trend which emerged throughout the paper was the strength of 
institutional forces and their reluctance to change. Organizational theory predicts an organization 
making efforts to reinvent itself when the original purpose for its creation has ended. This 
behavior is readily apparent in the actions taken by NATO immediately after the end of the Cold 
War. NATO attempted to find new threats and thus new purposes for it to remain relevant, and 
ultimately it settled on taking action on behalf of the UN, acting as a peace enforcer in a variety 
of different conflicts, and enlarging itself in order to increase the stability of Europe. 
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The actions on behalf of the United Nations have renewed NATO; giving the alliance a 
chance to perform a new mission in addition to its traditional defensive maneuvers. In addition to 
the actions on behalf of the United Nations, NATO also took on other threats, expanding its 
jurisdiction to allow it to preemptively deal with conflicts which might have a later threat on the 
NATO members. Finally, the Alliance took on the new role of expansion, which worked to 
stabilize Central and Eastern Europe and prevent the expansion of powers, such as Russia, into 
the area. The expansion essentially became a new mission for the Alliance, using diplomacy 
instead of military might as an increase in cohesion and influence. All of these new missions, 
while not fabricated, were leapt upon by the bureaucratic elements as a continued reason for 
existence. Through these processes NATO was able to maintain its existence beyond the period 
when it should have deteriorated, and keep itself relevant in the new era of world politics. 
The final consistent trend within NATO’s history is its development into a “security 
community” or rather an area where no military conflict can conceivably take place between the 
participating members. The members of NATO have worked, traded, and fought together for so 
many years that the prospect of actual conflict in the foreseeable future is virtually impossible. 
Both constructivist and liberalist theory would lead us to conclude that the nations will continue 
to work together in a political framework, whether or not they proceed with joint military action. 
The Trans-Atlantic relationship will not go anywhere for a long time. 
The conclusions we can reach, based upon the previous trends, are that the North Atlantic 
Treaty will reach its end as a military alliance in the following years (as eloquently stated by 
Kenneth Waltz, “NATO’s days aren’t numbered but its years are”149), yet there will remain a 
political alliance. The shape of this political body is difficult to predict, that it will maintain the 
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general form of NATO’s councils and meetings of ministers is probable, but the conclusion that 
can be reached is that the military body as a whole will end. There is simply no reason for it to 
continue as a military body, given that there are no serious threats which emerge in the next 5-10 
years.  
Implications and Suggestions 
 The dissolution of NATO as a military alliance could have a very serious impact on the 
power structures of Europe and its surrounding areas. If it does not retire gracefully, with 
maintenance of the predicted political ties, there is a possibility of a return to the multipolar 
power politics which defined the nineteenth and twentieth century’s in Europe. With the fall of 
such a powerful military body could come a void of power, allowing for the rise of another great 
power. Such a development, especially in the years of atomic weaponry, would be potentially 
disastrous for the peace of Europe and the world as a whole. Therefore, it is important that care 
be taken that the political ties and alliances which have aided in the maintenance of NATO be 
preserved in the organizations absence. The following section will provide a rough timeline of 
NATO’s dissolution and the policy suggestions for maintaining peace in Europe (as well as 
ensuring the adherence to certain interests of both sides of the Atlantic). 
 In the short term it is likely that very little change will be seen in NATO as an 
organization. The tensions apparent in the Libya crisis and the Afghanistan situation will become 
more consistent in the various actions taken by the Alliance, but the need for allies in the 
fulfillment of each ally’s interests is sufficient enough to maintain a certain level of cohesion. 
Much like in Kosovo, where the allies gave up certain doctrinal necessities to ensure 
cooperation, the short term future involvements of the Alliance will involve increasingly tense 
collaboration in exchange for the completion of certain interests. For instance, the United States 
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should continue to work within NATO and give certain concessions to its European allies in 
order to ensure cooperation and support in the Afghanistan campaign. America needs the 
legitimacy provided by NATO support, so until Afghanistan is completed, it should, and 
probably will, continue to support European interests in other locations. The European allies also 
will have realized that performing any major military operation without American aid is 
impossible. The Libya situation has shown that fact more powerfully than any other conflict in 
recent history. Therefore, they will continue to make concessions with the United States, such as 
working in Afghanistan despite the lack of popular support, in order to retain American support 
for their more regional interests. 
 In the mid-term the solidification of NATO as a body used for dealing with national 
interests will be complete. In Joseph Nye’s phrase, the Alliance will become an “alliance à la 
carte,” where each ally can grab the others in order to fulfill certain regional needs.150 The 
Alliance will remain united in name only, with the majority of its actions being taken in 
exchange for commitments of future support for possible regional interests. From an American 
perspective, the issue with this framework is the limited usefulness of the European allies in 
dealing with the problems which it is likely to face in its future. The Middle East and Asia are 
the two most likely locations of conflict for the United States, and Europe is not nearly 
influential enough in that area in order for the United States to continue supporting Europe in its 
regional endeavors. The United States will thus shift more and more of its troops out of Europe 
and towards the areas of conflict. Furthermore, given the European public’s lack of enthusiasm 
for military policy, it is likely that the nations of Europe will retain a marginal military power 
supported by the threat of nuclear weapons. While NATO will continue in name due mostly to 
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the strength of the institutional forces, its unity will be a myth, made reality only in times of 
crisis. 
 In the long term, the involvement of the United States in European affairs will be 
marginal. Faced with conflicts in the East, and given the need for the United States to act 
multilaterally in its foreign affairs, in order to justify intervention, it is likely that the United 
States will create a sort of NATO like body in the area to balance the potential threat of growing 
powers in China or other regional powers in Asia and the Middle East.151 The United States will 
also finish its movement of forces towards the areas of greater crisis. Without the strong military 
commitment of the United States, the utility of NATO as a military force in Europe will become 
marginal as well; with its role taken over by either the EU or a regional alliance emerging to fill 
the void left by NATO. Politically, if the United States acts rationally, the Transatlantic 
Relationship will remain strong through continued trade and interactions. This will maintain the 
support of Europe, which will be essential in justifying actions through multilateral cooperation. 
This relationship will probably continue to be expressed through a body similar to NATO, but 
without the military aspects of the Alliance; in essence an area of discussion between leaders. 
 NATO’s end as a military alliance is virtually inevitable, given the current trends of the 
political landscape. However, there is no reason why the Trans-Atlantic “security community” 
cannot endure. Continued political interactions and discussions between Europe and the United 
States will be integral in the continuation of peace in Europe, for this will allow cooperation 
instead of multipolar competition. As NATO reaches its end, the allies would be wise to allow it 
to decline gracefully, thus preventing the return of the chaotic power politics in NATO’s past.  
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